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Liberalization of China-US Air Transport Market: 
Assessing the Impacts of the 2004 and 2007 Protocols 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines China’s considerations in reaching the 2004 and 2007 Air Service 
Agreement Protocols with the United States (US) and the impacts of such policy on the China-
US market from the perspective of China.  Analysis shows that the 2004 and the 2007 Protocols 
have profound impacts on the China-US market.  The two Protocols have been associated with 
phenomenal traffic growth and intensified competition.  Passengers also benefit from much 
more choice in terms of both airlines and routing.  Over time, Chinese carriers’ operating 
performance and financial performance have gradually improved after the liberalization 
expressed in the Protocols.  However, the industry’s hub-building initiatives are still seriously 
challenged by competing hubs in Seoul and Tokyo which have diverted substantial number of 
passengers moving between the China and US markets.  Such issues have to be addressed in 
order to create a win-win outcome for both countries.   
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1. Introduction 
Since the first Open Skies agreement was signed between the United States (US) and the 
Netherlands in 1978, the US has been making every possible effort to expand its Open Skies 
partners around the world.  China, as one of the fastest growing aviation markets and 
economies, as well as US’s key trading partner, is among its top priorities. The years 2004 and 
2007 represented significant breakthroughs in US-China negotiations with two Protocols being 
signed which radically liberalized traffic rights arrangements between the two countries and 
transformed what was a highly restrictive bilateral regime to a more liberal market. This paper 
examines China’s considerations in reaching the 2004 and 2007 protocols and the impacts of 
such policy on the China-US aviation market, as seen from the perspective of China. The study 
contributes to the literature on liberalization by providing much needed insights into the 
liberalization between the two largest aviation markets in the world. The rest of this paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 reviews China’s policy and experience of domestic 
deregulation and international liberalization. Section 3 examines the evolution of the China-
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US air service agreements. Section 4 analyses China’s considerations in reaching the 2004 and 
2007 Protocols. Section 5 assesses the impacts of the two protocols from China’s perspective. 
And finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. China’s Policy and Experience of Domestic Deregulation and International 
Liberalization 
Founded in early 1950s, China’s airline industry was controlled by the military through the 
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), a division of the Air Force. This organization  
was then separated from the military and became a civilian authority directly under the State 
Council of China in 1980, with six regional administrative bureaus created at the same time. 
Between 1980 and 1986, CAAC acted not only as an industry regulator, but also as the owner 
of the country’s sole airline (CAAC) engaged in its day-to-day operations.  All aspects of the 
industry, such as market entry, route authority, frequencies, fare, aircraft purchasing, funding 
and even passenger eligibility for taking flights, heavily controlled by this  government agency 
(Zhang and Chen, 2003).  Such a centralized system was challenged by the rapid air traffic 
growth starting from the mid-1980s, and the industry was decentralized with a number of new 
airlines established and various reforms taking place after 1986.  A particular noteworthy 
reform was airline consolidation in 2002 where nine CAAC-controlled airlines were 
consolidated into three airline groups, namely, Air China, China Eastern and China Southern 
airlines.  After the 2002 airline consolidation, the Chinese government gradually deregulated 
the domestic market; carriers were given greater freedom on route entry and more power to 
determine their own airfares (Lei and O’Connell, 2011).  During this process, CAAC 
completed its own transformation from both a regulator and an operator to a pure industry 
watchdog. 
 
As airline consolidation was completed in 2005, CAAC also removed its restrictions on private 
investment for domestic airlines. By the end of 2008, CAAC approved 14 new scheduled 
passenger airlines, with the majority of them being controlled by domestic private investors 
(Lei and O’Connell, 2011). The entry of the new carriers has intensified competition in the 
domestic market. By the end of 2014, airlines in the domestic market in China have enjoyed a 
high degree of freedom in route entry, subject to slot availability, and are able to set prices at 
market determined levels.  Premium fares in China were completely deregulated in 2012, 
although a cap on economy class fares in the domestic market, designed to protect consumers, 
was still in place in 2015.  
4 
 
In the international market, China was guided by a conservative policy until the late 1990s. Its 
policy aim was to protect the interests of its own carriers. This was partly because air transport 
was considered as a political instrument to serve China’s diplomatic needs, instead of a 
strategic sector in support of the country’s economic development. Such mindset was gradually 
changed as the Chinese economy became increasingly integrated into the world economy and 
the country was more exposed to the outside world. In 2003, CAAC declared China’s objective 
to liberalize its air transport market in a “proactive, progressive, orderly and safeguarded” 
manner, and to take a proactive attitude in embracing the trend of international liberalization. 
Since then, the industry regulator started to re-adjust its international policy in support of 
liberalization and international cooperation, and in the first several years took very radical steps 
forward. A fundamental change was that the interests of its own carriers would no longer be 
the sole and exclusive criteria for the government when negotiating traffic rights with foreign 
countries. At this time the key principles of CAAC’s international air transport policy were as 
follows:  
 To proactively embrace the trend of liberalization 
 To support China’s overall diplomatic policies 
 To support the national Opening-up Strategy and the objectives of social and economic 
development 
 To give special regard to meet the demand for international air transport required by 
the country’s foreign trade and tourism 
 To give special support to the western, northeast and central regions to establish and 
improve their international air links 
 To strike a balance among national interests, public interests and industry interests 
 To promote airport hub development  in China 
 To enhance overall competitiveness of the whole industry. (Han, 2014) 
 
As a result of the application of these new perspectives by 2014, China’s international aviation 
policy had the following characteristics: (1) multiple designation was allowed with 86 countries 
among the 115 Air Service Agreements (ASAs); (2) 27 ASAs had open route schedules; (3) 21 
ASAs have introduced unlimited capacity entitlements for 3rd and 4th freedom traffic rights 
for air cargo services; (4) cargo 5th traffic rights was agreed with eight countries (Han, 2014). 
China also agreed to relax pricing by adopting the “country of origin principle” or the “double-
disapproval principle” (Han, 2014). Within these policy achievements, the 2004 Protocol with 
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the US, and the subsequent 2007 Protocol, were the most remarkable and were regarded as 
milestones in the liberalization of China’s aviation policy.  After ten years of liberalization 
policy negotiations, the most liberal and flexible bilateral traffic rights regime was still the one 
with the US. 
 
3. Evolution of the China-US Air Services Agreement 
China and the US established diplomatic relations on 1 January, 1979. China-US aviation links 
were formally established a year later by the signing of the bilateral Air Services Agreement. 
Two carriers from each side were allowed to operate on specific routes (Route A and Route 
B1) as shown in Table 1. Based on that simple start six amendments were made in 1982, 1992, 
1995, 1999, 2004 and 2007.  Among these changes the 2004 and the 2007 Protocols were 
regarded as China’s most ambitious attempts in its international liberalization efforts and form 
the basis of the research outlined here.  
 
------------------------------ INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE--------------------------------------- 
 
The four years preceding the 2004 negotiations between China and the US witnessed robust 
growth of bilateral travel, especially after 2001 when China joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  There was an average 10% annual passenger growth rate, and 28% for 
air cargo (DOT, 1999-2003).  Driven by this booming market, US carriers were keen to further 
expand their operations, but  found themselves constrained by  the capacity entitlements in the 
existing ASA and they collectively used up all the 54 weekly frequencies by 2001, only two 
years after the 1999 Protocol was signed. Faced with growing demand but constrained by 
regulatory restrictions, the only solution for US carriers was to apply for additional flights. 
 
By contrast, Chinese carriers were less enthusiastic in providing further capacity on the routes. 
One possible reason was the difference in terms of overall strength compared with their US 
counterparts.  The combined international operations produced by the Chinese airline industry 
as a whole was approximately 10.3 billion revenue passenger miles in 2000, less than half of 
that performed by either United’s or Northwest’s Pacific operations for the same period 
(Meyer, 2002).  Also China’s total international traffic (measured by revenue tonne kilometres) 
accounted for only one eighth of that of the US side in 2002 (CAAC, 2003).  Another reason 
                                                          
1 Specific points of Route B were not agreed until the 1982 amendment was made. 
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might be that Chinese carriers were pre-occupied with the lucrative domestic market that had 
emerged from domestic liberalization, where the profit was much higher compared with 
international operations. At the same time, the poor financial performance of Chinese airlines 
in 2001, illustrated by losses totalling nearly US$10 million for the top three carriers, made the 
industry even more cautious about capacity expansion, especially in the China-US market, 
where the Chinese side was losing money over the years, as confirmed by Wang Ronghu, the 
then Director General of CAAC’s International Department, and the mastermind of the 2004 
Protocol (Caijing, 2004). As a result, the Chinese side only performed 44 weekly frequencies, 
81% of its 54 entitlement up until the 2003 summer schedule. 
 
After several rounds of tough negotiations, the 2004 Protocols were eventually reached.  Key 
provisions are summarized in Table 2.  As can be seen in the comparison between the ASAs in 
1999 and in 2004, the new Protocol was a significant development in China-US aviation 
relations.  Designation was increased from four to nine airlines from each side.  Access points 
were increased from 5 points in China and 12 points in the US for Route A (combination and 
all cargo services) to any point in China and any point in the US open to scheduled international 
services.  Weekly frequencies were increased by 195 (111 for all-cargo operations and 84 for 
combination services) from 54 to 249 for each side by 2010 through phased-in manner.   
 
------------------------------ INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE--------------------------------------- 
 
It is noteworthy that Chinese aviation market was divided into three zones when details of frequencies 
were specified, as can be seen in table 2.  Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou made up  Zone 1, points in 
eastern and coastal regions ( Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong (except Guangzhou), Hebei, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shangdong, Shanxi, Tianjin, and Zhejiang) were designated as  Zone 2, and 
points in central, western and northeast regions, ( Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, 
Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan, plus 
Hainan Island) made up as Zone 3.  Interestingly, such a geographic division is only applied to the 
Chinese market; the US was seen as a single market of many potential city markets.  The classification 
is mainly based on the different stages of economic development where Zone 1 is the most developed 
region in China followed by Zone 2, while Zone 3 is the least developed region and the arrangement 
reflected CAAC’s policy of giving special international air transport support to the western, 
northeast and central regions, as described in Section 2.  So there was a 249-frequency cap in Zone 
1 and Zone 2, with no limitation at all for any operations in Zone 3.  Moreover, China’s outbound 
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traffic is mainly concentrated in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.  Limiting frequencies to those cities 
protected the operations of Chinese airlines.     
 
There are several other important aspects of the 2004 Protocol.  It was the first time that foreign 
carriers were allowed to set up cargo hubs in China with full traffic rights. The relaxation on 
pricing control from double-approval to double-disapproval was unusual for China, given the 
Chinese legacy of market regulation and the weak financial performance of its major airlines.  
Furthermore, domestic, bilateral and third-country code-sharing were allowed though third 
country code-sharing of either Party needs to be agreed by airlines of the other Party, and is still subject 
to government approval on a case-by-case basis.  Another important development not visible in Table 
2 is that restrictions on commercial activities, including change of gauge and self-handling 
were relaxed in phased-in manner (US Department of State, 2004).  Although the 2004 Protocol 
was not a full “Open Skies” that the US had aimed at, it was the most liberal agreement China 
had ever signed with a major trading partner and was described as a “Free Skies” deal by the 
US (Field, 2004) since it effectively created a regional “Open Skies” with China (Beane, 2007). 
 
Additionally, an innovation of the 2004 Protocol was that it outlined a timetable for further 
discussions which were scheduled to be held in 2006 (US Department of State, 2004), hence 
becoming an obligation for the Chinese side.  After further rounds of bargaining, the ASA was 
revised in 2007, further removing restrictions on designation, capacity and cargo operations, 
while retaining essential restrictions about charter operations, third-country code-sharing and 
passenger 5th traffic rights (US Department of State, 2007).  The entries in Table 2 show that 
designation would be liberalized for China as of 1 August 2007 and the same would apply to 
the US on Route B staring from March 2011.  On the basis of the 2004 capacity entitlement, 
an additional 70 weekly passenger frequencies to China Zone 1 and Zone 2 could be added by 
each side by March 2012, while the cargo frequency cap would be removed as of March 2011. 
Operations to China Zone 3 would be fully liberalized, i.e. no limitations on either designation 
or frequencies for both sides.  Furthermore, both sides acknowledged their mutual, ultimate 
objective as the full liberalization of their bilateral air transport market, and also promised to 
work together with each other to reach a new agreement as soon as possible (US Department 
of State, 2007).   
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5. China’s Considerations in Reaching the 2004 and 2007 Protocols 
Acknowledging the very substantial differences in the scale of the airlines as well as in the 
economic and policy systems of the two nations involved, it is perhaps surprising that the 
changes in the ASAs outlined above have been achieved in such a short time. The aspirations 
of the US side here seem easier to understand as they have adopted a consistent stance on open 
skies in ASA negotiations.  However, insight on China’s position is less well developed.  This 
Section analyses China’s considerations in reaching the 2004 and 2007 protocols based on 
CAAC’s international air transport policy as outlined in Section 2. 
 
A first step in understanding the negotiations, and their outcome, requires an understanding of 
the political context at the time.  Serving China’s political and diplomatic needs, and enhancing 
China-US national relations, both appear to be an important considerations for China in 
reaching the 2004 and 2007 Protocols.  A strong bilateral relationship with the US was seen at 
the time a top priority for China, and traffic rights arrangements played an important part of 
the country’s overall diplomacy policies.  Therefore, in the process of opening up its 
international air transport market, China appeared to have seen liberalization arrangements 
with the US at the top of its agenda, in the belief that a more liberal bilateral air transport market 
would promote greater exchanges of people and goods, and so would lay a more solid 
foundation for further enhancing bilateral national relations.  That policy stance reflected 
China’s position at that time as it sought WTO membership; it may have believed that the US’s 
support would be of paramount importance to achieve such a target (Prime, 2002).  
Furthermore, China was seeking to be elected as Part 1 member of the ICAO Council and any 
positive responses to ICAO’s calls for liberalization would be helpful. As a matter of fact, 
China obtained its Part 1 membership in October 2004 (Xinhua, 2004), which, together with 
the 2004 Protocol, was among the most eye-catching achievements in China’s aviation history.  
  
A different political context surrounded the CAAC’s approach to further liberalisation from 
2006 inwards, as air transport was, for the first time, brought into the US-China Strategic 
Economic Dialogue (SED2) framework at the US’s request。  The SED was initiated in 2006 
by US President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao, representing the highest-
level bilateral forum between the two nations.  An important objective of the SED is to provide 
                                                          
2 US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) was renamed as US-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (SE&D) in 2009. 
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a platform for senior officials to meet regularly for discussions of issues of strategic importance 
to both countries. By including traffic rights into SED negotiations the US was trying to 
overcome difficulties it believed it faced at the industry level (Williams, 2009).  This was an 
influence upon the 2007 Protocol, as the aviation negotiations were under a sort of obligation 
to deliver some meaningful achievements in this broad strategic context (Russell, 2007). At the 
time bilateral air talks were specially timed by both sides with the aim of fitting any possible 
conclusions of agreements into the SED programme (Russell, 2007).  Schofield (2007) argued 
that rights in aviation might even have been intentionally sacrificed to ensure US concessions 
in other areas, because when looked at in isolation, the Chinese were not well placed to achieve 
many positive gains from opening up their market further to US airlines. 
 
A second consideration for China in the 2004 and 2007 Protocol negotiations involved 
concerns surrounding national development policy.  Since 1999 the US had become China’s 
largest trading partner,  while China was evolved as the US’s fifth largest trading partner in 
2004, and its third largest one in 2007 (World Bank, 2015). From the perspective of economic 
development, it was imperative for China to accelerate its aviation liberalization to attract more 
US investment and further strengthen trade ties.  China was one of very few US’s major trading 
partners that had not signed an Open Skies agreement with it (DOS, 2011). Besides, China’s 
trade volume was projected to increase rapidly and continuously in years ahead and aviation 
was expected to play a critical role in that trade.  For instance, the liberal cargo traffic rights 
were intended to support China’s foreign trade and its export-oriented economy.  As Chinese 
cargo carriers were traditionally weak and were unable to build cargo hubs themselves, the 
“cargo hub” clause of the 2004 Protocol aimed at encouraging US cargo operators to establish 
their hubs in China, so as to make China’s overall investment, economic and trade environment 
more attractive. A study conducted by US Bureau of Transport Statistics (BTS) (2004) revealed 
that air freight was the fastest growing segment of the US cargo industry, and expansion of 
aviation opportunities between the two nations could facilitate export of US high tech and high-
value goods to China. For China, the aviation relationship and cooperation with the US was 
vital, since further development of parts of Chinese industry still relied on its support and 
assistance of advanced US technology.  It would also mean that more US airlines, businesses 
and travellers could take advantage of the growing trade between the two economies (HKTDC, 
2004). Therefore, the US pushed its counterpart really hard through all negotiations on traffic 
rights arrangements, as an important part of the overall bilateral aviation relations, while the 
CAAC had a range of reasons to consider the US claims seriously. 
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Regional and urban considerations entered the Chinese perspective at this time as well. At the 
regional scale, the fully liberalized arrangements in China Zone 3 were designed to support 
China’s attempt to boost regional economic and social advancement via the “West 
Development” and “Rejuvenation of the Northeast Region” strategies. Likewise, provincial 
governments, aiming at promoting local economy and inward investment through attracting 
more international flights, also pushed hard for further liberalization.  In urban areas,  major 
Chinese airports, especially those who have been aspired to become main hubs, were looking 
forward to as many international flights as possible, with those linking the US regarded as their 
top priority, no matter they would be operated by Chinese airlines or US carriers.  
 
The concern with hubs entered the 2004 and 2007 negotiations as a desire to prevent traffic 
diversion to third countries. Wolf (2001) argues that regulation of an air transport market 
generates spill-over effects to other markets that are interconnected by route networks. Traffic 
diversion benefits countries which have already liberalized their air links not only on routes 
that are substitutes for the regulated one within the same market, but also in other markets. 
Consequently, a country, if still executing regulation with liberalized interconnected markets, 
runs the risk that its air links degenerate to merely spokes of hub operations in other countries. 
Such effects appear to have started to unfold in China.  By the end of 2003, US had Open Skies 
agreements with  ten  Asian economies, including South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Taiwan (DOS, 2011). These Open Skies deals played an important role in helping US 
carriers to develop their networks in the Asia Pacific region which had implications for the hub 
roles of certain airports. For instance, Korean Air and Japan Airlines Cargo operated between 
China and the US via Tokyo and Seoul respectively, using 6th traffic rights. In passenger 
traffic, Japan’s Tokyo Narita airport and Korea’s Incheon airport are well ahead of Chinese 
airports in hub competition. Such an advantage may be partly attributed to their more liberal 
international air transport policies, especially with the US, while China’s more restrictive 
traffic rights regime up to 2004 may have facilitated hub building at these airports. Thus, one 
important consideration in China’s approach to negotiations may have been to reduce third 
country traffic diversion and so support the industry’s own hub building initiatives. 
 
A final factor here might have been a decision by China to match attitudes to the global 
liberalization trend.  Instead of waiting for its “closed door” to be knocked open, the industry 
regulator may have seen an opportunity to create stronger, more competitive and experienced 
airlines  by exposing them to the fierce and head-to-head competition with their foreign 
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counterparts. 
 
5. The Impacts of the 2004 and 2007 Protocols 
Most studies find that liberalisation of bilaterals triggered substantial traffic growth (Gomez-
Ibanez and Morgan, 1984; Dresner and Windle, 1995; Marlin, 1995; Maillebiau and Hansen, 
1995; Piermartini and Rousova, 2008; Warnock-Smith and Morrell, 2008).  Table 3 shows that 
China-US market follows the same pattern.  The race among US airlines to get into the Chinese 
market was already heated before the 2004 Protocol was signed. Delta, American and 
Continental finally won the battle and got the new designations, while the incumbents also 
benefited by either launching new routes or increasing frequencies. Competition within the US 
for the additional 111 weekly cargo frequencies was even more intense as the Department of 
Transportation (DoT) received applications for more than 200 flights (Caijing, 2004). Finally, 
Fedex managed to increase its weekly flights by six and started hub building in Guangzhou. 
Polar Air Cargo launched a new all-cargo service as well. As to the Chinese airline industry, 
except for very few prospective entrants, such as Shanghai International Cargo, Yangtze River 
Express and Hainan Airlines, who benefited directly from this deal by obtaining China-US 
route licences, the general sentiment was panic. In the week following the agreement’s signing, 
both China Eastern and China Southern saw their stock price diving, while that of their major 
US counterparts shooting up (Caijing, 2004).  
 
-------------------------------- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE------------------------------------- 
 
Given access to more recent data it is now possible to explore the effect of this two stage 
liberalization on the market as it was operating in 2014. The impact of liberalization can be 
charted via the change in the number of airlines, and the city pairs flown.  Table 3 shows that 
total number of designated airlines operating in the China-US market doubled from four in 
2004 to eight in 2014 with the US recording the largest increase.  Nevertheless, as airlines are 
competing mostly in the city-pair or airport-pair markets3, increased number of players does 
not necessarily mean more intensive competition. In fact the number of airport-pairs served in 
the China-US market increased dramatically from 8 in 2004 to 22 in 2014, and those served by 
more than one carrier increased from 1 in 2004 to 8 in 2014. While in the US, the rule of traffic 
                                                          
3 “Airport-pair” is defined in this paper as two airports served by scheduled non-stop flights, with at 
least two weekly frequencies. 
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right allocation is based on the best public interest, Table 3 clearly shows that China follows 
“one route, one airline” policy, so that  only one airline from China is allowed to serve a route 
in the China-US market. The arrangement seems to protect Chinese airlines from internal 
competition, while boosting the potential of each US city market for the designated carrier. 
 
Over half of the airport-pair markets were served by one airline only, which might suggest a  
lack of local competition as a result of the national liberalization. However, given the 
complexity of the domestic networks in both China and the US, connecting passengers account 
for a big share of the total traffic on each city pair. So in essence the routes themselves are in 
competition.  As an illustration, a passenger travelling from Philadelphia to Beijing (where no 
direct flights are available),  may travel through an east coast hub by connecting with United 
from Washington (IAD), Air China from New York (JFK) or Continental from Newark (EWR), 
or through the central region by travelling with United or American Airlines from Chicago 
(ORD). All the five options are of equal convenience, thus competing with each other for the 
passenger in question. Therefore, more routes served mean more choices for the public, and 
consequently increased competition among airlines. 
 
Table 4 further shows the total number of weekly frequencies increased from 53 in 2004 to 251 
in 2014 while the number of seats supplied in the market increased from 17,174 to 71,074 
during the same period, or a 15.3% average annual growth, as opposed to 2.4% annual growth 
rate between 2001 to 2004. It is worth pointing out that US carriers’ share of weekly seats 
declined substantially between 2002 and 2004. This is mainly due to a change in Northwest’s 
Asian strategy. It operated 13 direct flights per week between US and China before the 11th 
September 2001 attacks, but in 2002 all of them were routed via Tokyo using 5th traffic rights. 
Such a shift in operations had great impact on the total seats supplied by the US carriers as a 
whole, as Northwest was a major player in the China-US market. Another reason was that the 
September 2001 attacks led to a significant market contraction, especially from the US side.  
The positive gain for the US out of the liberalization can be seen after 2004 as US carriers 
reversed Chinese airlines’ dominant position by wining 54% of the market share in 2005 in 
terms of weekly seats, which represented 78% growth rate against the previous year, while the 
growth rate for Chinese airlines was a mere 2%.  US carriers’ dominant position persisted in 
the next few years with 2011 witnessed the largest (34 percentage points) between the two in 
terms of weekly seats. What is also worth mentioning is that the scope provided by the 2007 
Protocol helped the US airlines withstand the impact of the global financial crisis as traffic 
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growth in the China-US market was still  positive growth in 2008, as opposed to a traffic 
decrease of over 15% in the US international market overall (DOT, 2008).  For Chinese airlines 
there was a reduction in weekly seats between 2007 and 2009. Nevertheless, the Chinese side 
started to catch up from 2009 and by 2014, the market share of Chinese airlines in terms of 
weekly seats was equal with that of their US counterparts. A key reason behind the Chinese 
carriers’ improvement of performance was that the number of Chinese passengers travelling to 
the US has increased dramatically in the past few years.  When the initial decisions on 
liberalization were taken in 2004, 1.3 million US nationals travelled to China which was over 
six times greater than the number of Chinese travellers moving in the opposite direction 
(CNTA, 2005). Rapid economic growth in China, along with a relaxation of visa regulations 
for Chinese nationals has almost equalised the two flows. In 2013, the number of Chinese 
nationals travelling to the US increased to 1.97 million which was very close to the number 
(2.09 million) of US nationals travelled to China (CNTA, 2014).  As Chinese travellers are 
more likely to fly with their home carriers, which have local marketing, culture and language 
advantages compared to the US airlines, the increased number of Chinese tourists certainly 
helped Chinese carriers expand their share of the China-US market. 
 
A constraint on the US share of the Chinese market is the fact that the vast majority of US 
carriers’ operations in China were limited to Beijing and Shanghai, as shown in Figure 1. 
Chengdu was the only city outside of Beijing and Shanghai directly served by a US carrier with 
3 weekly flights operated by United Airlines from San Francisco in 2014.  By contrast, Figure 
2 shows that airports in the US served by Chinese airlines expanded from the traditional 
destinations in Los Angeles and San Francisco to now include Boston, Honolulu, Washington, 
Houston, New York, Chicago, and Seattle. Such change of landscape benefits Chinese airlines 
as most of the US airports served by Chinese airlines have spare capacity, while the airports in 
Beijing and Shanghai are heavily congested and it is difficult to obtain additional slots, hence 
limiting US carriers’ ability to expand capacity in the Chinese market.  
 
------------------------------ INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE-------------------------------------- 
 
------------------------------ INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE-------------------------------------- 
 
Though US carriers were given unrestricted traffic rights to serve airports in China’s more 
remote Zone 3 in 2007, US carriers appear to be unenthusiastic about serving airports outside 
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of Beijing and Shanghai. This is understandable as most of the outbound traffic to the US is 
concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai which makes direct flights from other cities to the US 
not economically viable.  As will be discussed below, these markets can also be served via 
code–share flights through Tokyo, Seoul and Hong Kong. Consequently, in recent years US 
carriers only managed to increase their  weekly frequencies to China from 109 in 2011 to 129 
in 2014 (see Table 4), while their Chinese rivals’ weekly frequencies have more than doubled 
from 51 in 2011 to 122 in 2014. To summarize, a market boom driven by an increasing number 
of Chinese tourists, coupled with US carriers’ difficulties of expanding capacity in the Chinese 
market, has resulted in US carriers gradually losing market share to their Chinese rivals.  Such 
outcomes may have reflected CAAC’s forward thinking when negotiating the 2004 and 2007 
Protocols, especially as the initial impacts were firmly biased toward the US. 
 
The cost of airfares is of course a major consideration in liberalization policies. Figure 3 shows 
monthly average ticket prices charged by Chinese and US carriers in the China-US market from 
2008.  These were actual prices charged extracted from IATA PaxIS database.  As the full force 
of liberalization began to be felt, the fares charged by the Chinese carriers were almost 20% 
lower than their US counterparts during most of the period from January 2008 to March 2012. 
Nevertheless, fares charged by Chinese airlines have started to rise since April 2012. Between 
June 2012 and September 2012, the fares charged by Chinese carriers were on a par with their 
US counterparts, suggesting the improvement of financial performance of Chinese airlines. 
 
------------------------------ INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE-------------------------------------- 
 
As previously discussed, an important consideration of China to liberalize its air transport 
market was to prevent third-country traffic diversion. However, Figure 4 reveals that passenger 
leakage to other hubs has worsened in the past few years. Passengers travelling in the China-
US market more than doubled from 1.3 million in 2008 to 2.7 million in 2013 according to 
PaxIS database. In 2008, 14% of passengers travelling between China and the US were “lost” 
to other countries, of which over 97% connected at Tokyo, Seoul and Hong Kong. By 2013 the 
ratio of passenger leakage to a third country increased to 20%, of which 86% passengers were 
diverted through Seoul, Hong Kong and Tokyo.  While Hong Kong is a Special Administrative 
Region of China, the loss of traffic to Seoul and Tokyo is an alarming finding for Chinese 
airports, whose hub building strategy has been seriously challenged.  Such a high ratio of traffic 
leakage may be due to the following reasons.  One is that US airlines traditionally use Tokyo 
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as a hub for Asia Pacific traffic.  Another reason is that airlines in Japan and Korea provide 
higher frequencies to more non-stop destinations in the US at lower prices than their Chinese 
counterparts (Fu et al, 2015), hence attracting substantial Chinese passengers transferring at 
Incheon and Narita. 
 
------------------------------ INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE-------------------------------------- 
 
------------------------------ INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE-------------------------------------- 
 
The increasing traffic diversion through Japan and Korea makes US’s demand for more liberal 
arrangements on third-country code-sharing unacceptable to China (Fu et al, 2015). Both Japan 
and Korea have strong and mature networks serving China. Code-sharing with airlines in both 
countries enables US carriers to bypass Chinese frequency restrictions, and at the same time 
expand their presence in China without launching new routes. Those arrangements mean that 
there are difficulties facing China’s policy of developing direct international air links to the US 
from China’s secondary cities.  Japan and Korea could also benefit from such operations, as 
the US could help them fill their aircraft by supplying transfer passengers. This would help 
them enhance their competitiveness on the China-Japan and China-Korea routes respectively, 
and further strengthen their advantages as Asian hubs. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Analysis shows that the 2004 and the 2007 Air Services Agreement Protocols have been 
associated with a profound impact on the China-US market. The two Protocols, along with the 
rapid economic expansion of China and its trade link with the US have facilitated phenomenal 
traffic growth, with frequency and seat capacity dramatically increased over their respective 
2003 figures. At the same time, the level of competition appears to have intensified with the 
number of airlines in service increased, and the number of non-stop routes expanded 
dramatically. Although most of the routes are still operated by a single carrier, passengers have 
much more choice in terms of both airlines and routing.  This is particularly so for the US 
where a hub-and-spoke network generally determines that the majority of traffic is transported 
through specific connections; one route added to a hub would add a number of routing options.  
 
While US carriers made substantial gains in capturing market share from their Chinese 
counterparts in the first few years of liberalization, Chinese airlines have closed the gap quickly 
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since 2010.  Their financial performance in the China-US market has also improved over time.  
The changing competitive landscape in the China-US market is attributed to two factors. One 
is due to the rapid increase of Chinese outbound tourists to the US. The other is that Chinese 
airlines fly from Beijing and Shanghai to a large number of US airports, most of which still 
have spare capacity, while US carriers’ operations in China are highly concentrated at capacity 
constrained airports in Beijing and Shanghai. Therefore, US carriers find it difficult to benefit 
from the booming China-US market by deploying more capacity on these routes. However, 
such a situation may change when Beijing’s second airport schedules to opens in 2019. With 
planned capacity of 72 million passengers a year by 2025 and over 100 million passengers in 
the longer term, the new airport will add abundant capacity to the Beijing area4 (Beijing New 
Airport Construction Headquarters, 2015). As a result of the relief of capacity constraints, US 
carriers may be able to schedule more flights to Beijing. For Chinese airlines, it is imperative 
for them to improve their underlying competitiveness in order to sustain their advantages in the 
China-US market.   
 
This study also reveals that China’s hub-building initiatives are seriously challenged by 
competing hubs in Seoul and Tokyo which have diverted substantial number of passengers in 
the China-US markets.  A strategy which may be considered by Chinese airlines is to form 
joint ventures with their US counterparts. Such cooperation would allow airlines in China and 
the US to coordinate their routes, schedules, products and fares, which would, at least in theory, 
bring costs down, rationalise capacity input and improve competitive strength for both sides. 
If such benefits can be passed on to passengers by offering them lower fares or more value 
added products and services, this may make connecting flights via Seoul and Tokyo less 
attractive. Furthermore, joint ventures may be more important to the Chinese side, since 
diverted traffic, generally speaking, is a price-sensitive segment, which constitutes the bulk of 
customers for Chinese airlines.  Nevertheless, full joint ventures require anti-trust immunity 
from US Government which may not be granted until a China-US open skies agreement is 
signed to ensure consolidation is not anti-competitive.  Having said that, the recent 
                                                          
4 Beijing’s existing airport (Beijing Capital International Airport) handled 84 million passengers in 
2014 (CAAC, 2015) 
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announcement of strategic partnership5 between Delta and China Easter seems to represent a 
major step towards developing deeper and more powerful relationships (CAPA, 2015).  Such 
issues may have to be considered in future negotiations between China and the US in order to 
create a win-win outcome for both countries.   
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Table 1 Highlights of China-US air services agreements in the 1980s 
Items Provisions 
 
 
 
Routes 
Route A: Beijing-Shanghai-Tokyo/or another point in Japan-Honolulu-Los 
Angeles-San Francisco-New York 
 
Route B: Beijing-Guangzhou-Shanghai-Tokyo/or another point in Japan-
Honolulu/or Seattle-Los Angeles-San Francisco-Chicago 
Designation Two for each side 
Frequencies Two weekly frequencies for each side 
Increased to six by the end of the 1980s  
 
Source: authors based on 1980 China-US ASA and 1982 Amendment (US Department of 
State, 1980 & 1982) 
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Table 2 Key features of China-US air services agreements in 1999, 2004 and 2007 
Key Features 1999 Protocol 2004 Protocol 2007 Protocol 
Designation Four airlines from each side 
Nine airlines from each side by 
2010 through phased-in manner 
China may designate an unlimited 
airlines as of 1 August 2007; US may 
designate an unlimited airlines on Route 
B as of 25 March 2011; no limitation on 
designation to China Zone 3 
Access points 
Route A (combination and all cargo 
services): US airlines - 5 points in 
China; Chinese airlines - 12 points in 
the US. Route B (all cargo services): 
any points in the US or China, via any 
intermediate points, and beyond to any 
points outside China or US. 
Between any point in China and 
any point in the US open to 
scheduled international services; 
US airlines are allowed to set up 
cargo hubs within China 
Same as 2004 Protocol 
Capacity/frequency 
54 weekly frequencies for each side by 
1 April 2001 through phased-in 
manner. 
249 weekly frequencies for each 
side by 2010 through phased-in 
manner; no frequency limitations 
for points in China Zone 3 
An additional 70 weekly passenger 
frequencies to China Zone 1 and Zone 2  
by each side by March 2012; no 
frequency limitations for cargo as of 
March 2011; no  frequency limitation 
for points in China Zone 3 
 
Code Sharing 
Code sharing between designated 
Chinese and US airlines are allowed 
between pre-determined points 
Domestic, bilateral and third-
country code sharing were allowed. 
Additional code share arrangements 
 
Tariffs Double approval Double-disapproval Double-disapproval 
 
Source: authors based on China-US ASA in 1999, 2004, and 2007 (US Department of State, 1999, 2004, 2007) 
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Table 3 Evolution of number of passenger airlines and airport pairs in the China-US 
market 
 
Year 
Number of 
Airlines Airport pairs 
China US Total 
one 
airline 
only 
by 
Chinese 
carriers 
one 
airline 
only 
by US 
carriers 
one 
airline 
only 
2001 3 2 7 5 4 4 4 4 
2002 3 1 5 3 4 4 2 2 
2003 3 1 7 6 6 6 2 2 
2004 3 1 8 7 6 6 3 3 
2005 3 2 9 8 5 5 5 5 
2006 3 3 9 7 5 5 5 4 
2007 3 3 11 9 6 6 6 5 
2008 4 4 13 11 7 7 7 6 
2009 4 5 15 13 7 7 9 8 
2010 4 4 14 10 7 7 9 7 
2011 4 4 16 11 7 7 12 9 
2012 4 3 16 11 8 8 11 8 
2013 4 3 18 12 10 10 12 9 
2014 4 4 22 14 14 14 15 12 
 
Note: The data are for the direct flights in the China-US market. 
Source: Compiled by the authors from OAG database. 
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Table 4 Development of weekly passenger frequencies and weekly seats in the China-US 
market 
Total
Chinese 
carriers
Share of 
Chinese 
Carrier
US 
carriers
Share of 
US 
Carriers
Total
Chinese 
carriers
Share of 
Chinese 
Carrier
US 
carriers
Share of 
US 
Carriers
2001 45 22 49% 23 51% 16,005 7,495 47% 8,510 53%
2002 37 21 57% 16 43% 12,612 7,226 57% 5,386 43%
2003 22 15 68% 8 36% 6,952 4,418 64% 2,534 36%
2004 53 30 57% 23 43% 17,174 10,238 60% 6,936 40%
2005 70 31 44% 39 56% 22,798 10,468 46% 12,330 54%
2006 83 37 45% 47 57% 25,960 11,801 45% 14,159 55%
2007 95 41 43% 54 57% 30,485 13,016 43% 17,469 57%
2008 102 40 39% 62 61% 32,436 12,890 40% 19,546 60%
2009 112 41 37% 71 63% 35,582 12,798 36% 22,784 64%
2010 131 48 37% 83 63% 40,140 14,999 37% 25,142 63%
2011 160 51 32% 109 68% 47,278 15,585 33% 31,693 67%
2012 171 64 37% 106 62% 48,378 19,112 40% 29,267 60%
2013 197 81 41% 116 59% 56,747 25,313 45% 31,434 55%
2014 251 122 49% 129 51% 71,074 35,371 50% 35,703 50%
Year
Weekly Frequency Weekly Seats
 
Note: the data are based on the first week of July in each year for direct passenger flights in the  
China-US market. 
Source: Compiled by the authors from OAG database.   
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Table 5 Passenger leakage in the China-US market in 2008 and 2013 
 
Airport 
Code
Transfer 
Pax
Share of 
Transfer Pax
Airport 
Code
Transfer 
Pax
Share of 
Transfer Pax
NRT 84,278 46.0% ICN 172,705 31.6%
ICN 54,832 30.0% HKG 160,447 29.4%
HKG 38,313 20.9% NRT 137,764 25.2%
YVR 1,825 1.0% YYZ 18,804 3.4%
YYZ 1,539 0.8% YVR 12,922 2.4%
CDG 442 0.2% DOH 9,525 1.7%
LHR 309 0.2% HND 7,873 1.4%
MNL 277 0.2% DXB 7,089 1.3%
KIX 240 0.1% MNL 3,185 0.6%
FRA 226 0.1% IST 3,120 0.6%
BKK 173 0.1% TPE 2,354 0.4%
DXB 110 0.1% PUS 1,329 0.2%
SIN 103 0.1% LHR 1,216 0.2%
MUC 91 0.0% KIX 1,019 0.2%
2008 2013
 
 
Note: BKK=Bangkok Suvarnabhumi airport; CDG=Paris Charles De Gaulle airport; DOH=Doha airport;  
DXB=Dubai airport; FRA=Frankfurt airport; HKG=Hong Kong International Airport;  
HND=Tokyo Haneda airport; ICN=Seoul Incheon airport; IST=Istanbul airport;  
KIX=Kansai airport; LHR=London Heathrow Airport; MNL=; MUC=Munich airport; 
NRT=Tokyo Narita airport; PUS=Busan Gimhae airport; SIN= Singapore Changi Airport;  
TPE=Taipei airport; YVR=Vancouver airport; YYZ=Toronto airport;  
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from PaxIS database 
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Figure 1 US carriers’ seat capacity distribution at Chinese airports from 2001 and 2014  
 
 
Note: CTU=Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport; PEK=Beijing Capital International 
Airport; PVG=Shanghai Pudong International Airport 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from OAG database. 
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Figure 2 Chinese carriers’ seat capacity distribution at US airports from 2001 and 2014  
 
 
 
Note: BOS=Boston airport; HNL=Honolulu airport:; IAD: Washington Dulles airport; 
IAH=Houston George Bush airport; JFK=New York John F Kennedy airport; LAX=Los Angel 
airport; ORD=Chicago O’Hare airport; SEA=Seattle airport; SFO=San Francisco airport 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from OAG database. 
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Figure 3 Average fares (US$) of Chinese and US airlines in the China-US market 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from PaxIS database 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Traffic diversion in 2008 and 2013 in the China – US market  
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